Sensitive Command Token - So much offense in my defense

Introduction:  Many people have pointed out that there are a handful of commands that are overwhelmingly run by attackers on compromised hosts (and seldom ever by regular users/usage). Reliably alerting when a user on your code-sign server runs whoami.exe can mean the difference between catching a compromise in week-1 (before the attackers dig in) and learning about the attack on CNN. Introducing our new Sensitive Command Canarytoken. This quick/simple Canarytoken alerts you any time your chosen command is executed on a host.  For example: This token creates registry keys to alert you anytime whoami.exe runs on a host. If an attacker lands on the server and runs whoami.exe (as most attackers almost instinctively do) they get the results they expect. And you get an alert to let you know that something bad is afoot. Why this token? In nearly every ransomware report, we can see attackers running a series of predictable commands on endpoints.

Canaries as Network Motion Sensors

Introduction This post is the first in a series by Canary customers where they detail how they integrated Canaries and Canarytokens into their security practice. This series hopes to showcase how organizations of varying sizes and structures deployed and acted on alerts to improve the security of their networks. Casey Smith recently joined Thinkst Labs, today he’s sharing his experiences with Canaries and Canarytokens from his previous role as a customer. Background Prior to joining Thinkst, I worked for a number of years as the Principal analyst on a security team at an organization of ~3500 people with a highly regulated security practice. Our team was responsible for several systems: Email, Web Application, Proxy Server, Host based EDR, Application Control, Security Analytics, as well as Incident Response, internal testing and penetration testing. I would consider our team a fairly mature security team, with lots of tools, software, and telemetry to inform our security response. We

Always be Hacking...

We discussed this Scott Forstall clip internally and figured it was worth sharing since theres so much going on in just 5 minutes. Bradley commented on how familiar it felt to how we roll and it’s worth digging in to this little more. Quick Background In 2007 Apple was not yet a trillion dollar company, but its star was definitely on the rise. Jobs was back, OSX was taking root and the iPod was game changer. (Their market cap was ~$174 Billion). Demo Prep. They are about to demo the iPhone in a few months and already you notice them sweating the presentation details. Should the CEO of AT&T be on stage? When do we read him in? You can watch a zillion tech demos, and you will find demo’ers who look like they practiced on the plane ride in.. instead, this is thoughtful craft. Getting AT&T excited So they are flying to Vegas to show AT&T the phones. Notice again, it’s not just “here’s an invite to our launch – you can have a speaking slot” where some big-shot CEO can waffle

Creating REST API Canary endpoints

Given the importance of REST API endpoints for most networks and applications, we wanted a way to use (existing) Canarytokens, or Canaries to detect unauthorized access to a REST API. (Like all things Canary) We wanted something easy to use that delivers immediate value. Here we present several new approaches, and look forward to hearing from the community on the usefulness and ways to increase insight here for network defenders.   Challenge:  APIs are everywhere and permeate most organization's daily web based workflows. Both internal and external services often rely on the use of REST APIs. From workstation management to web applications, from complex business logic and application integrations, to payment processing services, APIs form a backbone for all kinds of crucial services.  It started us thinking, how we might be able to create and use Canaries and Canaryokens to catch or detect unauthorized REST API endpoint or key usage? Our end goal would be for teams to receive an al